

COPY FROM U.S.A. SYNDICATE, 530 East 72nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10021
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE -- FLASH! EXCLUSIVE!

SECRET NSC-68 MUST BE DECLASSIFIED!

by
ALICE WIDENER
Publisher, U.S.A. Magazine

NEW YORK CITY, July 13, 1971 -- It is ironic that the Johnson Administration, worst sufferer from the leak of the Pentagon papers to the New York Times in 1971, itself condoned the leak of a top secret National Security Council document -- "NSC-68" -- to Cabell Phillips of The Times in April 1964. Thus a bad precedent was set seven years ago. With all extraneous aspects cut away, the heart of the matter concerning the 1964 and 1971 security leaks of U.S. Government secrets to The Times is this: Either our federal laws concerning national security are valid and equally applicable to all citizens or they are not. If the laws are Constitutional but not applicable to all, then the American concept of equality under law is dead.

Seven years ago, I raised this question when Mr. Phillips leaked the substance of NSC-68 on the New York Times front page, April 13, 1964, under the headline "SECRET PAPER SET KOREA POLICY -- U.S. Entry and Restraint of MacArthur Were Part of Wide Strategic Concept." Cabell Phillips opened his article with the statement, "A still secret paper prepared by the National Security Council 1950 stood at the center of the Truman-MacArthur dispute over the conduct of the Korean War. ... The paper, known simply as NSC-68, prescribed a broad strategy for the United States in international relations and particularly with respect to the Soviet Union." Mr. Phillips said NSC-68 was formally signed "accepted" by President Truman in April 1950, "approximately 60 days before the Communist North Korean Army stormed southward..." Cabell Phillips then quoted former Secretary of State Dean Acheson as telling him that NSC-68 "is one of the great documents in our history." Mr. Phillips then proceeded to paraphrase the substance of the top secret document, several times beginning and ending sentences with "it (NSC-68) said."

Immediately thereafter, on April 18, 1964, I wrote a column (published but unheeded!) "LEAK OF NSC-68 WORST CASE OF MANAGED NEWS." (Obviously, the leak was aimed at rebutting published reports of General MacArthur's observations given to reporters confidentially with the request that they be withheld until after his death.) In my column of April 1964, I said that in the interest of national security and a free press, newspaper publishers should ask President Johnson for all the facts involved in the Cabell Phillips leak to find out whether the provisions of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 793 as amended by Section 18, Internal Security Act of 1950 applied impartially to all citizens, as federal laws are intended to do. "Or," I wrote, "is there an elite in government circles and on the staff of a pet newspaper who are above and beyond the federal law?"

In the interest of the people's right to know and of a free press, I wrote in April 1964, publishers should "request President Johnson to order declassification of NSC-68 and related documents so that we can know the full contents." I added that we could not possibly learn the whole truth of the Truman-MacArthur dispute "or any

WIDENER

PAGE TWO

other vital matter through an insufficient and illegal handout of secret information by a lawbreaker to a pet. " Since Mr. Phillips wrote that he had discussed NSC-68 with Mr. Acheson, I asked in print whether it might be Mr. Acheson himself who leaked the substance of NSC-68 to Mr. Phillips.

Now in 1971 we have had an illegal handout of secret Pentagon papers by a self-confessed lawbreaker, Daniel Ellsberg, to a few pets. In any 1971-1972 Congressional investigation of the Vietnam War and Pentagon papers there should also be investigation of the Korean War and NSC-68, because it was the still-secret NSC-68 that laid down the U.S. "no-win" policy for fighting wars that governed President Truman's conduct of the Korean War and also President Kennedy's and President Johnson's conduct of the Vietnam War.

In April 1964, Cabell Phillips ended his article with the admission that General MacArthur "probably never saw NSC-68." Mr. Phillips then asserted that certainly the General "was informed about its details."

Was he? I strongly doubt it. Late in 1951 during an exclusive private interview in New York City, General Douglas MacArthur told me, "I am convinced I was restrained in Korea by some secret Administration policy directive or strategy about which I was not informed."

Confronted now with the dreadful consequences of no-win in Korea which produced no-win in Vietnam, the Nixon Administration ought to declassify NSC-68 immediately. It's time for the American people to be told the whole truth about our wars in Asia, not part-truths known only by a few officials and leaked for special political purposes to the New York Times according to timing determined by the New York Times for its own political purposes, whatever they may be.

END

COPYRIGHT 1971 U.S.A. SYNDICATE

EDITORS FYI: I took notes of the interview with General MacArthur and published some of the material before his death with his permission.

Pat,

*File
Senate Internal Security
Committee*

25X1A [REDACTED] called regarding the attached story and said
that it just isn't true. The individual was some type of an electrical engineer
25X1A but did not have access to classified work as reported here. [REDACTED] said
they were sending a suggested reply for McCloskey's use in news conference
along the following lines: "The British have announced that he has been
permitted to stay in Great Britain. I have nothing further to add, suggest
if you have any further questions on this they should be addressed to the
British." I am surprised we have not heard again from Jay or some of our
other clients.

Ey 6

Soviet Data Given U.S. By Defector

By Don Cook
Los Angeles Times

HELSINKI, July 7—Important technological intelligence bearing directly on the vital problems of the strategic arms limitation talks is now reaching the United States through a Soviet scientist who defected to the West six weeks ago.

At the time of his defection during the Le Bourget international air show in Paris in late May, the scientist was under a cover name of Anatol Fedoseyev. But additional details of his identity and the means by which he was rapidly spirited out of France by the British have now become available from various sources.

His real name is said to be Ignatiy Alexandrovitch Nikitrine (or some variation thereof) and he was reportedly a deputy director of the Soviet space program in charge of electronics and cybernetics.

He is 61 years old, studied at Cambridge University during the 1930s and had been secretly made a Hero of the Soviet Union for his long service in Russian scientific programs.

See DEFECTOR, A17, Col. 7

DEFECTOR, From A1

His knowledge of the Soviet space, missile, electronics and scientific program is such that it is enabling American intelligence experts already interviewing the Soviet scientist—who now may be in the United States—to make much more precise estimates of these vital problems of the SALT negotiation:

- The design, the effectiveness and the deployment of Soviet antiballistic missile defenses.

- The state of development of Soviet multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRV) which give an intercontinental missile the capability of hitting several targets simultaneously.

- More precise information on what is actually going into the 60-odd new missile silo sites which satellite intelligence photographs turned up in the Soviet Union late last year.

- Soviet development of a fractional orbital bombardment system which in theory can be placed in space and then targeted on command from the ground.

In an overall general sense, Nikitrine is said to be in possession of precise knowledge of Russian electronics and missile development which may enable American scientists and intelligence experts to check their own estimates and assessments with much more precision and certainty of exactly where the Russians stand in research, development, deployment and future planning of space weaponry.

From the standpoint of the arms limitation negotiations, which resume here Thursday, this means that the American government will be in a clear position to make decisions on the kind of arms limitation arrangements it can offer to the Russians, and which it can police with confidence and with a minimum risk to security.

The details of his defection are a fascinating mixture of skilled, simple, rapid action by the British—a large jump ahead of a crash counter-operation by the Soviet Embassy in Paris.

Under his cover identity of "Fedoseyev"—a routine procedure which the Soviets use

to hide the true identity of important men who are not supposed to be in the public eye—Nikitrine arrived at Le Bourget airport for the air show aboard the new Soviet supersonic transport.

When the moment came, he avoided the French entirely. He left his hotel and first took a taxi to the Place de la Republique, one of the few places in Paris which he knew by name. He bought some postcards and sat in a bistro writing cards to his wife and children in Russia—and watching to see if he was being observed or followed.

The coast clear and his mind made up, he hailed another taxi. When he got to the British embassy, the British moved fast. There was an immediate discussion with London and a top-level decision was taken to smuggle him out of France at once. Within two hours he had been issued a suitably soiled British passport and left the embassy in an inconspicuous automobile driven by a member of the embassy staff.

The car was "covered" for the start of the journey by another British driver, and Nikitrine and his escort set off for Calais—a drive of four to five hours. At Calais, a British car ferry scheduled to sail for Dover was held on secret orders until the embassy car with its Soviet passenger arrived. There was only the most cursory passport clearance by the French who knew nothing of who the passenger was, and at Dover the British security services picked up Nikitrine and whisked him off to a secret hiding-place in the country.

Meanwhile, back in Paris, when the scientist did not make the regular "bed check" at his hotel with KGB security agents who accompany every Soviet party abroad, panic broke out at the Soviet embassy. Over 60 Russians attached to the embassy were mobilized by the KGB and dispatched to Orly airport and Le Bourget, armed and with orders to intercept Nikitrine at all cost. This operation was observed by other intelligence men in Paris but it was useless because Nikitrine was well on his way.